Navy O-3 Closes On Two IR Contacts At 26,000 Feet

Brief

During a night DCA sortie on 27 October 2020, an O-3 was directed by the KINGPIN controller to identify unknown contacts at approximately 26,000 feet. Radar lock and target pod video were obtained, but the operator could not close within 16.9 nautical miles. The target pod revealed two IR-significant contacts, one circling the other, before both vanished at an extreme rate the operator described as occurring in '1130TH OF A SECOND.' Visual tally yielded two red blinking strobes; electronic indications flagged noise jamming confirmed by two chevrons, false trackfiles, and an ambiguous arc.

Metadata

Agency

Department of War

Release

5/8/26

Incident

10/27/20

Type

PDF • .pdf

Length

1 pages

Classification

UNCLASSIFIED

Programs

SPEAR

Tags

balloon-shaped, metallic, reflective, red-blinking-strobes, IR-contacts, noise-jamming, circling-motion, instantaneous-disappearance, DCA-mission, 2020, CENTCOM-AOR, SPEAR

Key points

• Two contacts were grouped together at approximately 26,000 feet, moving at 20 knots on a heading of 060 degrees.p.1
• Radar lock was established with a stable trackfile confirmed; target pod video was recorded, but the operator was unable to close to less than 16.9 nautical miles.p.1
• The target pod detected two IR-significant contacts, one circling the other, before both vanished nearly instantaneously — logged as occurring in '1130TH OF A SECOND,' almost certainly an OCR corruption of '1/30th of a second.'p.1
• Visual tally identified the objects as two red blinking strobes; the standardized shape form returned metallic, balloon-shaped, opaque, and reflective, plus an 'other shape' entry, suggesting standard categories were insufficient.p.1
• Three EA indicators were simultaneously flagged: Letter Identifier, False Trackfiles, and Ambiguous Arc; noise jamming was separately confirmed by two chevrons.p.1
• First detection was fixed at bearing/elevation ZIM 248/17 relative to the bullseye in use.p.1
• The SPEAR program sanitizes all identifying aircrew and squadron data from submitted reports prior to analysis.p.1
• Declassified by MG Richard A. Harrison; approved for release to AARO on 27 March 2026 under USCENTCOM MOR 26-0038 to MOR 26-0046.p.1

Verbatim

• KINGPIN DIRECTED ID OF UNKNOWN CONTACT.

  p.1

• OBTAINED RADAR LOCK AND TARGET POD VIDEO BUT UNABLE TO GET CLOSER THAN 16.9NM TID GETA BETTER ID.

  p.1

• THE TARGET POD SHOWED 2 IR SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS.

  p.1

• NOISE JAMMING WAS RECIEVED. NOISE JAMMING WAS INDICATED BY TWO CHEVRONS.

  p.1

• FIRST DETECTION OF THE RANGE FOULERS WERE AT B/E ZIM 248/17

  p.1

Most interesting

• The phrase '1130TH OF A SECOND' is almost certainly an OCR corruption of '1/30th of a second' (approximately 33 milliseconds) — the fraction slash was dropped by the scanner, making the reported disappearance speed physically extraordinary if accurate.
• Three EA indicators were checked simultaneously: Letter Identifier, False Trackfiles, and Ambiguous Arc — a combination more consistent with active electronic countermeasure behavior than with passive reflection or a conventional aircraft.
• The operator achieved a stable radar trackfile while the EA section simultaneously flagged false trackfiles — a potentially contradictory data point that may indicate the contacts were projecting deceptive electronic signatures.
• The SPEAR program's sanitization protocol removes all aircrew and squadron identifiers before the report enters the analysis pipeline, making source attribution from this document impossible without the original unredacted filing.
• An 'other shape' checkbox was selected in addition to balloon-shaped, metallic, opaque, and reflective — suggesting the objects did not map cleanly onto any standard reporting category.
• The form instructs crews to rip all display tapes for the full interaction duration and save them as .wmv files for repository upload, indicating video evidence from this encounter was captured and submitted through a separate chain.
• The standoff distance of 16.9 nautical miles — despite radar lock and an active target pod — suggests the contacts were either maneuvering to maintain that distance or the operational environment prevented a closer intercept.