DISCLOSURE / FILE
CIA Office of Scientific Intelligence memorandum reporting the January 14-18, 1953 Robertson Panel's five-day review of Air Force UFO data, which found no direct national-security threat but recommended a public debunking and education program to prevent reporting channels from being overloaded.
Report of the Scientific Advisory Panel on Unidentified Flying Objects (Robertson Panel Report), robertsonpanelreport.pdf
CIA Office of Scientific Intelligence memorandum reporting the January 14-18, 1953 Robertson Panel's five-day review of Air Force UFO data, which found no direct national-security threat but recommended a public debunking and education program to prevent reporting channels from being overloaded.
Convened by the CIA's Office of Scientific Intelligence after the 4 December 1952 Intelligence Advisory Committee directed the Director of Central Intelligence to enlist scientists to appraise the evidence, the panel met for eight sessions between January 14 and 18, 1953, reviewing Air Technical Intelligence Center case files, the Tremonton, Utah (2 July 1952) and Great Falls, Montana (15 August 1950) motion picture films, and the Project TWINKLE and Project STORK investigative programs. The panel concluded unanimously that there was no evidence of a direct threat to national security in the objects sighted, that reasonable explanations could be suggested for most sightings, and that the Air Force's reporting system was generating a mass of low-grade reports that could clog channels of communication. The panel rejected the Navy Photo Interpretation Laboratory's self-luminous interpretation of the Tremonton film (which had consumed about 1,000 man-hours), favoring birds or sunlight reflections, and identified related dangers including misidentification of enemy artifacts, overloading of emergency channels, and vulnerability to psychological warfare. It recommended an educational program to deemphasize the subject and reduce public concern.
The Panel concluded unanimously that there 1vas no evidence of a direct threat to national security in the objects sightedp.11
the mass receipt of lo1-r-grade reports which tend to overload channels of communication with material quite irrelevant to hostile objects that might some day appearp.12
It was interesting to note that none of the members of the Panel w·ere loath to accept that this earth might be visited by extra- terrestial intelligent beings of some sont, some day. Hhat they did not find vras any evidence that related the objects sighted to space travelers.p.13
the burden of proof is on the sig~r, not the explainer.p.17
If. U.F.O.'s become dis- credited in o. reaction to the nflying saucer" scare, or if report- ing channels are saturated with false and poorly documented reports, our capability of detecting hostile activity will be reduced.p.18
With the poor results of the year-long Project TWINKLE program of 24-hour instrumentation watch (two frames of film showing nothing distinguishable)p.19
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Approved For Re!se 2001/08/or-f?ta-RI:I'I'S:fRo46cl«fooff/ t:1/vf 1(-5.1/ /tU- fl -~~ -~t·~~~ REPORT OF MEEI'INOO OF SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY PANEL ON UNIDENTIFIED FLYING OBJECI'S CONVENED BY OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE, CIA January 14 - 18, 1953 25X1A Declassified b}' _ ooees'1_ gat~ .. 2 1 JAtL 19ZS .. Approved For Release 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP81R00560R000100030027-0
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.. Approved For Aase 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP81R005601o100030027-0 ... -tt·'fJ'~~··q!. .... ,.._...,, Released in MORI -.-S~~JI;_,,_~£-~"'Jt<l+\':t' indications of hostile action, anc the cultiv.?tion of a morbid national fsycholop,y in which skillful hostile propc>.[;c>noa could induce hysterical ~\ 1rehavior v.nd harmful distrust of duly constituted authority. 4. In order most effectively to stren~then the national fa.cilities for the timely recopnition cnC: the ap-propri8te handling of true indications of hostile action, 2nd to minimize the concomitcmt dane;ers alluded to abo1-e, the Panel recommends: a. That the national security a~encies tc1.ke i.rnmedic:te steps to strip the UnidentifiE":d flying Objects of the special status they ha-,,c been [~iven anc'c the aura of mystery they have unfortunately c>CCft.'ired; b. Th2t the national security ar-;encies institute policies on intelli:-;ence, training, and public ed.ucation 6esiQ.ned to prepare the material defenses and the morale of the cotmtry to recognize most promptly and to react most effectively to true indications of hostile intent or action. ·~re sue;e;est that these sims may be .9chieved by an intee;rated program desiened to reassure the public of the total lack of evidence oi :inimic2l forces behind the phenomena, to tr2in personnelt to recocnize anc" reject false indications ouickly and effectively, and to strene;then regular channels for the evaluation of andprompt reaction to true :indications of hostile measures. /s/ Lloyd V. Derkner I ssoci2.ted Universities, Inc. ~/:-=s~/~I-~~ -~P~·;.....:r.:,;.o~b:..:e:.:;:r:..:t~s:-.:o:.:;n=--___,.--:::,.--~-....,.---, Chc? irm~n California Institute of Technology /s/ S. A. Goudsmit Brookhaven Hati('mal Labor2.tories /r::/ Luis ~-;. Alv~rez Unlli"ersity of California /s/ Thornton P2r:e Approved For Release 2001/08/07 :J~M\-~~~~BPJ>q§pftQq4,\qg,o30027-0Concatenated page-by-page transcript. Born-digital pages came through pdf.js; scanned pages were transcribed by Claude vision OCR. Pages marked unreadable failed multiple OCR retries (heavy redaction, microfilm artifacts, or blank separators) and are kept in place for audit.
T h eB l a c kV a u l t T h eB l a c k V a u l t i s t h el a r g e s t o n l i n eF r e e d o m o f I n f o r ma t i o n A c t ( F O I A ) d o c u me n t c l e a r i n g h o u s ei nt h ew o r l d .T h er e s e a r c he f f o r t s h e r ea r e r e s p o n s i b l ef o r t h ed e c l a s s i f i c a t i o no f h u n d r e d s o f t h o u s a n d s o f p a g e s r e l e a s e db y t h eU . S . G o v e r n me n t &Mi l i t a r y . D i s c o v e r t h eT r u t h a t : h t t p : / / www. t h e b l a c k v a u l t . c o m T h i s d o c u me n t i s ma d ea v a i l a b l et h r o u g ht h ed e c l a s s i f i c a t i o ne f f o r t s a n dr e s e a r c ho f J o h nG r e e n e w a l d , J r . , c r e a t o r o f :
Approved For Re!se 2001/08/or-f?ta-RI:I'I'S:fRo46cl«fooff/ t:1/vf 1(-5.1/ /tU- fl -~~ -~t·~~~ REPORT OF MEEI'INOO OF SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY PANEL ON UNIDENTIFIED FLYING OBJECI'S CONVENED BY OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE, CIA January 14 - 18, 1953 25X1A Declassified b}' _ ooees'1_ gat~ .. 2 1 JAtL 19ZS .. Approved For Release 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP81R00560R000100030027-0
- ~ . Approved For Release 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP81R00560R0.00030027-0 Purpose ~·-~·· fi!#~-..:::i'lftlltl!ftM!!I:Ml INDEX Part I: History of Meetings of Panel Part II: Comments and Suggestions of Panel General On Lack of Danger Air Force Reporting System Artifacts of Extraterrestial Origin Tremonton, Utah, Sighting Potential Related Dangers Geographic Locations of Unexplained Sightings Instrumentation to Obtain Data Radar Problem of Mutual Intereference Unexplained Cosmic Ray Phenomena Educational Program Unofficial Investigating Groups Increase in Number of Sightings Report of Panel List of Personnel Concerned with Meetings List of Documentary EVidence Presented Page 1 1 7 7 8 9 10 11 15 15 16 18 19 19 23 24 Tab A Tab B Tab C Approved For Release 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP81R00560R000100030027-0
• • . Approved For Release 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP81R00560R.100030027-0 ·~ ~~ 16 February 1953 MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence FROM 25X1A SUBJEar Report of Meetings of the Office of Scientific Intelligence Scientific Advisory Panel 6n Unidentified Flying Objects, January 14 - 18, 1953 PURPOSE The purpose of this memorandum is to present: a. A brief history of the meetings of the 0/SI Advisory Panel On Unidentified Flying Objects (Part I), b. An unofficial supplement to the offic!IAl Panel Report to AD/SI setting forth comments and suggestions of the Panel Members which they believed were inappropriate for inclusion in the formal report (Part II). PART I: HISTORY OF MEETINGS GENERAL After consideration of the subject of "unidentified flying objectsn at the 4 December meeting of the Intelligence Advisory C~mnittee, the following action was agreed: "The Director of Central Intelligence will: a. Enlist the services of selected scientists to review and appraise the available evidence in the light of pertinent scientific theories •••• " Following the delegation of this action to the Assistant DirectDr for Scientific Intelligence and preliminary investigation, Approved For Release 2001/~~P81R00560R000100030027-0 ss~~tion
25X1A 25X1A 25X1A 25X1A • ~ Approved For Release 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP81R00560R.100030027-0 ~~ ~n an Advisory Panel of selected scientists was assembled. In cooperation 1vi th the Air Technical Intelligence Center, case histories of reported sightings and related material were made available for their study and consideration• Present at the initial meeting (0930 Wednesday, 14 January) 25X1A (1V&E Division), and the writer • Panel Member 1 25X1A absent until Friday afternoon. 25X1A present throughout the sessions to familiarize themselves with the subject, represent the substantive interest of their Divisions, and assist in administrative support of the meetings. (A list of personnel concerned with the meetings is given in Tab A). WEDNESDAY MORNING The AD/SI opened the meeting, reviewing CIA interest in the subject and action taken. This review included the mention of the 0/SI Study Group of August 1952 25X1A culminating in the briefing of the DCI, the ATIC November 21 briefing, 4 December IAC consideration, visit to ATIC (m1adwell 1 , and 0/SI concern over potential dangers to national security indirectly related to these sightings. ~~. ~~,,m~·~~ted these potential dangers. Following this intvo- duction, Dr. Chadwell turned the meeting over to 25X1A -; Approved· For Release 2001/08/07_~~1A-RDP81 R00560R0001 00030027-0
·' Approved For Reise 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP81R00560R.00030027-0 ,....,.~~lici.~ ~~~-.~y as Chairw~n of the Panel• enumerated the evidence availabl~ and requested consideration of specific reports and letters be taken by certain individuals present (Tab B). For example, case histories involving radar or radar and visual 25X1A sightings were selected for while reports of Green 25X1A Fireball phenomena, nocturnal lights, and suggested programs of 25X1A investigations were routed to Following these remarks, 25X1A the motion pictures of the sightings at Tremonton, Utah (2 July 1952) and Great Falls, Hontana (15 August 1950) were shown. The meeting adjourned at 1200. WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON The second meeting of the Panel opened at 1400. Lt. R. S. Neasham, USN, and Mr. Harry Woo of the USN Photo Interpretation Laboratory, Anacostia, presented the results of their analyses of the films mentioned above. This analysis evolved considerable discussion as elaborated upon below. Besides Panel members and CIA personnel, Capt. E. J. Ruppelt, Dr. J. Allen Nynak, Capt. Harry B. Smith (2-e-2), and Dr. Stephen Possony were present. Following the Photo Interpretation Lab presentation, Mr. E. J. Ruppelt spoke for about 40 minutes on ATIC methods of handling and evaluating reports of sighting and their efforts to improve the quality of reports. The meeting was adjourned at 1715. ~~4~~g~, ~~' -3- Approved For Release 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP81R00560R000100030027-0 25X1A
Approved For Reise 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP81R00560R.100030027-0 THU'RSDAY MORNING The third and fourth meetings of the Panel were held;Thw.sday, 15 Januaxy, commencing at 0900 with a two-hour break for luncheon. Besides Panel members.and CIA personnel, Mr. Ruppelt and Dr. Hynek were present for both sessions. In the morning, Mr. Ruppelt con- tinued his briefing on ATIC collection and analysis procedures. The Project STORK support at Battelle Memorial Institute, Columbus, was described by Dr. Hynek. A number of case histories were dis- cussed in detail and a motion picture film of seagulls was shown. A two hour break for lunch was taken at 1200. THURSDAY AFTERNOON 25X1A At 1400 hours gave a 40-minute briefing of Project TWINKLE, the investigatory project conducted by the Air Force Meteorological Research Center at Cambridge, ~~ss. In this briefing he pointed out the ~~y problems of setting up and manning 24-hour instrumentation watches of patrol cameras searching for sightings of U.F.O.'s. At 1615 Brig. Gen. William M. Garland joined the meeting with AD/SI. General Garland expressed his support of the Panel's efforts and stated three personal opinions: a. That greater use of Air Force intelligence officers in the field (for follow-up investigation) appeared desirable, but that they required thorough briefing. ·-""-~~~~f. ~-~-1 -4- Approved For Release 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP81R00560R000100030027-0
25X1A Approved For Reise 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP81R00560R.00030027-0 ~'WI' ~~n b • That vigorous effort should be made to declassify as many of the reports as possible. c. That some increase in the ATIC section devoted to U.F.o. analysis was indicated. This meeting 1vas adjourned at 1700. FRIDAY MORNING The fifth session of the Panel convened at 0900 with the same personnel present as enumerated for Thursday (vnth the exception of Brig. Gen. Garland) • From 0900 - 100 there was general discussion and study of reference material• Also, Dr. Hynek read a prepared paper making certain observations and conclusions. At gave a briefing on his fifteen months experience in Washington as Project Office for U.F.O.'s and his personal conclusions. There was considerable discussion of individual case histories of siggtings to which he referred. Following presentation, a number of additional case histories were examined and discussed with Messrs. - Ruppelt, and Hynek. The meeting adjourned at 1200 for luncheon. FRIDAY AFTERNOON This session opened at 1400. Besides Panel members and CIA personnel, Dre Hynek was present. as Panel Member, was present at this meeting for the first time. Progress of the meetings was reviewed by the Panel Chairman and tentative .s & ~.ii··•' S(!Jiiil~--~n Approved For Release 2001/08/07: <;~-RDP81R00560R000100030027-0 25X1A 25X1A 25X1A
·. Approved For Reise 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP81R00560R.100030027-0 ·~ :g~·~~ ~M~n conclusions reached. A general discussion followed and tentative reconnnendations considered• It vras agreed that the Chairman should draft a report of the Panel to AD/SI that evening for review by the Panel the next morning. The meeting adjourned at 1715. SATURDAY HORNING At 0945 the Chairman opened the seventh session and submitted a rough draft of the Panel Report to the members. This draft had been revievred and approved earlier by The next t;.m and one-half hours were consumed in discussion and revision of the draft. At 1100 the AD/SI joined the meeting and reported. that he had shown and discussed a copy of the initial rough draft to the Director of Intelligence, USAF, whose reaction was favorable. At 1200 the meeting was adjourned. SATURDAY AFrERNOON At 1400 the eighth and final meeting of' the Panel >vas opened. 25X1A Discussions and rewording of certain sentences of the Report occupied the first hour. (A copy of the final report is appended as Tab c.) This was followed by a review of work accomplished by the Panel, and restatement of individual Panel Member's opinions and suggestions on details that were felt inappropriate for inclusion inthe formal report. It was agreed that the writer would incorporate these comments in an internal report to the AD/SI. The material below represents this information. ~-~ Q~ .. ,.,::r.~.·~'" ~_,•f':~-.1. -6- Approved For Release 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP81R00560R000100030027-0
.Approved For Rel.e 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP81R00560RO&oo30027-0 .... IIPJ!fi'l'#'· ~1Jrlj!1!iUF IUfi-n PARr VI: COM~·:lENTS A.TID SUGGESTIONS OF PANEL GENERAL The Panel Members -vrere impressed (as have been others, includ- ing o/SI personnel) in the lack of sound data in the great majority of case histories; also, in the lack of speedy follovr-up due primarily to the modest size and limited facilities of the ATIC section concerned. Among the case histories of significant sightings discussed in detail "ivere the follmving: Bellefontaine, Ohio (1 August 1952); Tremonton, Utah (2 July 1952); Great Falls, Montana (15 August 1950); Yaa..~, Montana (1 September 1952); Washington, D.C. area (19 July 1952); and Haneda A.F.B., Japan (5 August 1952), Port Huron, Michigan (29 July 1952); and Presque Isle, Maine (10 October 1952)• After review and discussion of these cases (and about 15 others, in less detail), the Panel concluded that reasonable explanations could be suggested for most sightings and '~y deduction and scien- tific method it could be induced {given additional data) that other cases might be explained in a similar manner •" The Panel pointed out that because of the brevity of some sightings {e.g. 2-3 seconds) and the inability 6~ the "iv:i.tnesses to express themselves clearly {sometimes) that conclusive explanations could not be expected for every case reported• Furthermore, it was considered that, normally, it would be a great waste of effort to try to solve most of the sightings, unless such action would benefit a training and educational program (see below). The writings of Charles Fort were referenced ~-- Approved For Release 20Q;t~560R0001 00030027-0 -7.:.25X1A . Approved For Rel.e 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP81R00560RAoo030027-0 ..,.,.s.~~!O:I; ~·~l~~M@en to show that ustra.nge things in the sky" had been recorded for hundreds of years. It appeared obvious that there was no single explanation for a m~jority of the things seen. The presence of radar and astro- nomicsl specialists on the Panel proved of value at once in their confident recognition of phenomena related to their fields• It was apparent that specialists in such additional fields as psychology, meteorology, aerodynamics, ornithology and military air operations would extend the ability of the Panel to recognize many more cate- gories of little-known phenomena. ON lACK OF DANGE.:R The Panel concluded unanimously that there 1vas no evidence of a direct threat to national security in the objects sighted• Instances of nFoo Fighters 11 were cited• These were unexplained phenomena sighted by aircraft pilots during World War II in both European and Fa..r East theaters of operation wherein t'balls of light n would fly near or 1-Tith the aircraft and maneuver rapidly. They were believed to be electrostatic (similar to st. Elmo's fire) or electro- n~gnetic phenomena or possibly light reflections from ice crystals in the air, but their exact cause or nature was never defined. Both had been concerned in the investigation of these phenomena, but David T. Griggs (Professor of Geophysics at the University of California at Los Angeles) is believed to have been the most knowledgeable person on this subject. If the term "flying saucers" had been pop!llar in 1943 - 1945, these objects would ··~:@!W~:~f·~·, Si!t~~~ -8- Approved For Release 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP81R00560R000100030027-0
25X1A . Approved For Reise 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP81R00560Ra00030027-0 ~.J' ~'~'Moa have been so labeled. It was interesting that in at least two cases reviewed that the object sighted was categorized by as probably "Foo Fighters" to date unexplained but not dangerous; they were not happy thus to dismiss the sightings be calling them names. It 'lvas their feeling that these phenomena are 25X1A not beyond the domain of present knowledge of physical science, however. AIR FORCE REPORTING SYSTEM It was the Panel's opinion that some of the Air Force concern over U.F.O.'s (notwithstanding Air Defense Command anxiety over fast radar tracks) was probably caused by public pressure. The result today is that the Air·FOrce has instituted a fine channel for receiving reports of nearly anything anyone sees in the sky and fails to understand• This has been particularly encouraged in popu- lar articles on this and other subjects, such as space travel and science fiction. The result is the mass receipt of lo1-r-grade reports which tend to overload channels of communication with material quite irrelevant to hostile objects that might some day appear • The Panel agreed generally that this mass of poor-quality reports containing little, if any, scientific data was of no value. Quite the opposite, it was possibly dangerous in having a military service foster public concer-.a in "nocturnal meandering lights. 11 The implication being, since the interested agency 1ras military, that these objects were or might be potential direct threats to national security. Accord~ ingly, the need for deemphasization made itself apparent. Comments on a possible educational program are enumerated belmv ~ ~~w ~-!}~ Approved For Release 2001/08/07: G.~.:RDP81R00560R000100030027-0
25X1A 25X1A . Approved For Reise 200~~~R00560RAoo030027-0 ~~-,~- It was the opinion of that the "saucer" problem had been found to be different in nature from the detection and investigation of German V-l and V-2 guided missiles prior to their operational use in World War II. In this 1943-1944 intelligence operation (CROSSBOW), there was excellent intelligence and by June 1944 there "\vas material evidence of the existence of 'trlardware n obtained from crashed vehicles This evidence gave the investigating team a basis upon which to operate. The absence of any "hardware'' resulting from unexplained U.F .o. sightings lends a "will- of-the-wisp) nature to the ATIC problem. The results of their investi- gation, to date, strongly indicate that no evidence of hostile act or danger exists. Furthermore, the current reporting system would have little value in the case of detection of enemy attack by conventional aircraft or guided missiles; under such conditions 'trlardware" would be available almost at once. ARTJ:F.A.Cl'S OF E:zl!RATERRESTIAL ORIGm It was interesting to note that none of the members of the Panel w·ere loath to accept that this earth might be visited by extra- terrestial intelligent beings of some sont, some day. Hhat they did not find vras any evidence that related the objects sighted to space travelers. in his presentation, sh01ved how he had elim- inated each of the knovm and probable causes of sightings leaving him nextra-terrestial" as the only one remaining in many cases. background as an aeronautical engineer and technical intelligence 25X1A -10- Approved For Release 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP81R00560R000100030027-0
25X1A 25X1A Approved For Re.se ~001/08/07: CIA-RDP81R00560R-100030027-0 ~i\.~ ~~=-.::r ....... .e~ .. ~.. .-~. .. • Q~VJ""·~~!i,L~.,\1 officer (Project Officer, BLUEBOOK for 15 months) could not be slighted. However, the Panel could not accept any of the cases sighted by him because they were raw·, 1.mevaluated reports. Terrestial explanations of the sightings were suggested in some cases and in others the time of sighting was so short as to cause suspicion of visual impressions. It was noted by and others that extraterrestrial artifacts, if they did exist, are no cause for alarm; rather, they are in the realm of natural phenomena subject to scientific study, just as cosmic rays were at the time of their discovery 20 to 30 years ago. This was an attitude in whi6h did not concur, as he felt that such artifacts ivould be of inunediate and great concern not only to the U. S. but to all countries. (Nothing like a common threat to unite peoplesl) lllllllllnoted that present astronomical knowledge of the solar system m~~es the eixstence of intelligent beings (as we know the term) elsewhere than on the earth extremely unlikely, and the concentration of their attention by any controllable means confined to any one continent of the earth quite preposterous. TREMONTON, UTAH, SIGHTING This case was considered significant because of the excellent documentary evidence in the form of Kodachrome motion picture films (about 1600 frames). The Panel studied these films, the case history, ATIC's interpretation, and received a briefing by representatives of the USN Photo Interpretation Laboratory on their analysis of the film. This term had expend«d (at Air Force request) approximately -11- Approved For Release 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP81R00560R000100030027-0 25X1A
Approved For Re.se 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP81R00560R~00030027-0 ··•"""'$liiit:tl~~~'1~~,,.,, """'"">:50 'E'""e""rf'" ,. '"· ·">If<· ~&:~).~ 1000 man-hours of professional and sub-professional time in the preparation of graph plots of individual frames of the film, show- ing apparent and relative motion of objects and variation in their light intensity. It was the opinion of the P.I.L. representatives that the objects sighted were not birds, balloons or aircraft, were nnot reflections because there 1ras no blinking while passing through 60° of arc" and were, therefore, 11 self-luminous". Plots of motion and variation in light intensity of the objects were displayed, While the Panel Members were impressed by the evident enthusiasm, industry and extent of effort of the P.I.L. team, they could not accept the conclusions reached. Some of the reasons for this were as follows: • a. A semi-spherical object can readily produce a reflection of sunlight without ''blinking" through 60° of arc travel. b. Although no data was available on the ttalbedo" of birds or polyethylene ballons in bright sunlight, the apparent motions, sizes and brightnesses of the objects vrere considered strongly to suggest birds, particularly after the Panel viewed a short film sho\nng high reflectivity of seagulls in bright sunlight. c. P.I.L. description of the objects sighted as "circular, bluish-white" in color would be expected in cases of spectacular reflections of sunlight from convex surfaces where the brilliance of the reflection would obscure other portions of the object. ~~.!lW'~fllli:!-<t~ -"D"""'·l5't-"C"' "l'f',..l!i "'"''!"~~~ .. ,.,.~ .. . -~~ .. ~~ ~.~~~·~·~1\ "'' .. ·. •.• - Approved For Release 2001/08/07 :-efA--RDP81R00560R000100030027-0
Approved For Re.e 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP81R00560Roe00030027-0 ,•}_:· - . "' ·-,'. .. d• Objects in the Great Falls case vrere believed to have probably been aircraft, and the bright lights such reflections• e. There was no valid reason for the attempt to relate theobjects in the Tremonton sighting to those in the Great Falls sight- ing. This may have been due to misunderstanding in their directive. The objects in the Great Falls sighting are strongly suspected of being reflections of aircraft kno'vn to have been in the area. f• The intensity change in the Trementon lights was too great for acceptance of the P.I.L. hypothesis that the apparent motion and changing intensity of the lights indicated eA~remely high speed in small orbital paths. g. Apparent lack of guidance of investigators by those familiar with U.F.O• reports and explanations. h• .Analysis of light intensity of objects made from duplicate rather than original film• The original film was noted to have a much lighter background (affecting relative brightness of object) and the objects appeared much less bright. i. Method of obtaining data of light intensity appeared faulty because of unsuitability of equipment and questionable assumptions in making averages of readings. j. No data had been obtained on the sensitivity of Kodachrome film to light of various intensities using the sarae camera type at the same lens openings. -13- Approved For Release 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP81R00560R000100030027-0
'0. Approved For Re.se 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP81R00560R.00030027-0 k. Hand "jitter 11 frequencies (obtainable from early part of Tremonton film) were not removed from the plots of the "single pass plots" at the end of the film. The Panel believed strongly that the data available on this sighting was sufficient for positive identification if further data is obtained by photographing polyethylane "pillow" balloons released near the site under similar weather conditions, checking bird flight and relfection characteristics with competent ornithologists and calculating apparent "G" fo\-ces acting upon objects from their apparent tracks. It \vas concluded that the results of such tests would prob- ably lead to creditable explanations of value in an educational or training program. However, the Panel noted that the cost in technical manpovrer effort required to follm·r up and explain every one of the thousand or more reports received through channels each year (1 1 900 in 1952) could not be justified. It was felt that there ~<rill allvays be sightsings, for -.;.;hich complete data is lacking, that can only be explained with disproportionate effort and with a long time delay, if at all. The long delay in explaining a sighting tends to eliminate any intelligence value. The educational or training program should have as a major purpose the elimination of popular feeling that every sighting, no matter how poor the data, must be explained in detail• Attention should be directed to the requirement among scientists that a new phenomena, to be accepted, must be completely and convincingly docun1ented• In other words, the burden of proof is on the sig~r, not the explainer. ~~~~"!'' --~-llwi~.-i'Ji""e';-:-.n:lr"-E' -~.r ~~;~~!ton Approved For Release 2001/08/07 :t~A-RDP81R00560R000100030027-0
Approved For Re.e 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP81R00560R-00030027-0 ;porENTIAL RELATED DANGERS The Panel Members vTere in agreement with 0/SI opinion that, although evidence of' any direct threat :from these sightings ivas vmolly lacking, related dangers might well exist resulting from: a. ltisidentification of actual enemy artifacts by defense personnel• b• Overloading of emergency reporting channels with nfalsen information (nnoise to signal ratio" analogy- c. Subjectivity of' public to mass hysteria and greater vul- ~erability to possible enemy ~sychological warfare. Although not the concern of CIA, the first two of' these problems may seriously affect the Air Defense intelligence system, and should be studied by experts, possibly under ADC. If. U.F.O.'s become dis- credited in o. reaction to the nflying saucer" scare, or if report- ing channels are saturated with false and poorly documented reports, our capability of detecting hostile activity will be reduced. nr. Page noted that more competent screening or filtering of reported sightings at or near the source is required, and that this can best be accomplished by an educational program. GEOGRAPHIC LOCATIONS OF UNEXPLAINED SIGRTINGS 25X1A The map prepared by ATIC showing geogr~phic locations of officially reported unexplained sightings (1952 only) was ex8mined by the Panel. This map shol·red clusters in certain strategic areas such as Los Alamos. This might be explained on the basis of 24-hour watchful guard and -15- Approved For Release 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP81R00560R000100030027-0
. Approved For Rel.e 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP81R00560R0.00030027-0 ~;:i~~·&4!i'#\,\%t S@"~i~r,~ awareness of security measures near such locations. On the other hand, there had been no sightings in the vicinity of sensitive related AE establishments while there were occasionally multiple cases of unexplained sightings in non-strategic areas. FV.rthermore, there appeared to be no logical relationship to population centers. The Panel could find no ready explanation for these clusters. It wo.s noted, however, that if terrestrial n.rtifacts were to be observed it would be likely that they would be seen first near foreign areas rather than central U. S. INSTRUHENTATION'TO OBTAIN DATA The Panel was of the opinion that the present ATIC program to place 100 inexpensive 35 mm. stereo cameras in the hands of various airport control tower operators 1vould probably produce little valu- able data related to U.F.o. 's. HoweverJ it was recognized that such action 1-rould tend to allay public concern in the !!Ubject until an educational program had taken effect. It was believed that pro- curement of these cameras was partly the result of public pressure in July 1952. With the poor results of the year-long Project TWINKLE program of 24-hour instrumentation watch (two frames of film showing nothing distinguishable) J a widespread program of sky- watching 1-rould not be expected to yeild much direct data of value. There ~>ras considerable discussion of a possible "sky patrol 11 by amateur astronomers (Hynek) and by ivide-angle cameras and pointed out that at present a considerable fraction 25X1A m -16- Approved For Release 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP81R00560R000100030027-0 25X1A
Approved For Re.e 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP81R00560R~00030027-0 of the sky is now--and has been for many years--under surveillance every clear night in several meteor and aurora observing pro~s as vell as sky mapping programs at the various locations listed below. Although the attention of those astronomers is largely directed toward identified rather than unidentified objects, no case of any striking unidentified object is known to Dr. Hynek, Such an object would most certainly be reported if found on patrol plates; A case was cited where an astronomer refused to interrupt his exposure in order to photograph an alleged sighting in a different part of the sky; This led Dr. Hynek to say that, if a program of watching could be an adjunct of planned astronomical programs, little cost would be involved and that the trained astronomical personnel might photograph a sighting of an unidentified object. The location of same of these progr.5ms ru1d their directors are believed to be : a. Harvard University, Cru~bridge and New Mexico (meteor patrol) - Whipple. b, Yerkes Observatory, University of Chicago and Fort Davis, Texas (several programs)--Meinel (aurorae), Kuiper (asteroids), Morgan ('vide angle camera) • c, University of Alaska, Fairbanks (aurorae) - Elvey do Dominion Observatory, otta-vra (meteors) - Millman e. Palomar Observatory, California (sky map) - Minkowski f• Lick Observatory, California (sky map) - Shane ~ Bet.~·~·~ -17- Approved For Release 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP81R00560R000100030027-0 25X1AApproved For a:se 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP81R00560.100030027-0 S..~·ro@>~·!lr ·~ .. ........, .. S&&w:J411'.F·~e!!J$< It was agreed by the Panel that no government-sponsored program of optical nation-wide sky patrol is worthwhile at the present time, and that the encouragement of amateur astronomers to undertake such a program might have the adverse effect of' over-emphasizing rrflying sauceru stories in the public mind. However, the issue of radar'scope cameras for recording peculiar radar echoes would serve peveral pur- poses, including the better understanding of' radar interference as well ac ±dentif'ication of U.F.O.'s. RADAR PROBLm·1 OF .MUTUAL INTERFERENCE This characteristic problem of radar operation wherein the pulse signal (of approximately the same frequency) from station A may be picked up on the screen of station B and show as a high-speed track or series of dots was recognized to have probably caused a number of U.F.o. reports. This problem was underlined by inf'orw~tion received indicating ADC concern in solving this problem of signal identif'ication before service use of very high-speed aircraft or guided missiles 25X1A (1955-1956). believed that one answer to this problem 25X1A ~ra.s the uoe of a rrdoppler f'ilter't in the receiving circuit• suggested that the problem might be better solved by the use of a ttcontrolled jitter" wherein the operator receiving rrvery fast tracl{S 11 (on the order of 1000 - 10,000 m.p.h.) ~rould operate a circuit iihich would alter slightly his station's pulse frequency rate. If the signal received on the screen had been caused by mutual interference vdth another station, the track would now whow itself at a different distance Approved For Release 2001/08/07 ~.t:aA-RDP81R00560R000100030027-025X1A , Approved For Rel.e 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP81R00560R0.0030027-0 -&+~~- ..,,_,_-.t.~.jjtjara:(~. '· ... , .... 'D"C'~~ '· . . . '~~~- 25X1A from the center of the screen,-if it still appeared at all. felt such a technical solution was simpler and would cost much less than a "Doppler filter.rr UNEXPLAINED COS!!EC RAY PHENOMENA Two reported cases were examined: one at Palomar :Mountain, California, in October 1949, when cosmic ray counter wnet "off •cale for a few seconds,n a,pparently while a uvn of flying acmcers was observed visually; and t1vo, a series of oboervations by the "Los Alamos Bird Watchers Association" from August 1950 to January 1951, when cosmic ray coincidence counters behaved queerly. Circuit diagrams and records were available for the latter, and able quickly to point out that the recorded data were undoubtedly due to inatrumental effects that would have been recognized as such by more experienced observers~ The implication that radioactive effects ivere correlated with unidentified flying objects in these two cases vms, therefore, rejected by the Panel• EDUCATIONAL PROGRAM The Panel's concept of aborad educational program integrating efforts of all concerned agencies was that it should have two major aims: training and ttdebunking". The training aim would result in proper recognition of unusually illuminated objects (e.g., balloons, aircraft relfections) as well as natural phenomena (meteors, fireballs, mirages, noctilucent clouds). Both visual and radar recognition are concerned. There lvould be many "''~-~~. -19- Approved For Release 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP81R00560R000100030027-0 .
Approved Fo.:l:a.se 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP81R005.00100030027-0 ~~~tijt~"'m.J!I """~~; levels in such education from enlisted personnel to commend end rec:eP.rch personnel. Relative emphasis t'lnc_ oec;ree of explan2tion of <iifferent prof.rrms 1A'Ould correspond to the cataeories of duty (e.g., r2dar operatorf'; !Jilot8; control tmv-er operators; Grotmd Observer Corps personnel; anci officE.rs and enlisted men in other catP_gories.) This treining should result in a marl!'eci reduction in reports c2.1..1.sed by misi<ientification and result~mt confusion. The 11 cebunkine;11 a:iJn uould result in reduction in public interest in Hflyinc; saucers" vJhich tode1.y evoke~ a strong psychological reaction. This education could be accom:;lished by mass me<iia such television, motion pictures, and popular articles. Basis of such Education t·muld be actual case histories which had been puzzline; at first but later exple :ined. As in the ease of conjuring :);ricks, there is much less stimulation if the 11 secret 11 is known. Such a prop;ram should tend to reduce the current gul:tibility of the public mel consequently their susceptibility to clever hostile propaganda. The Panel noted that the general absence of Russian propae;anda based on a subject 1rl. th so many obvious possibilities for exploitation rd.cht indicate 2 possitle Russian official policy. I1ember-s of the Panel had ve.rious sup;~::estions related to the planning of such an educP.tional program. It 1.va s ::elt s·C.ronr;ly that psychologists fwniliar vJith mass psycholocy should advise on the nature and extent of the pro~ram. In this eonncction, Dr. Hac"ley Cantril (Princeton University) -.:m.s sup:p:ested. Cantril authored 11 Inva8:'_on from lvlars 1 ', (a study in the ""'"S""~"'e~~'E'<c~'' ~~~yt" 1 fM'iNI~ -20- Approved For Release 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP81R00560R000100030027-0
25X1A Approved For Reise 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP81R00560R.00030027-0 W•<&~><fSi·.~~~~:'.llf.i/!fl'<i;li.f ~~~ psycholor,y of panic, vJTitten about the f'2mous Orson ~Jelles radio broadcase in 1938) and has since performed advcmced laboratory studies in the field of perception. The names of Don Narquis (University of l•Iichie;an) and Leo Rosten ~·rere mentioned as possibly suitable a.s consultant psychologists. Also, someone ;·amiliar Nith mass communication techniques, psrhaps an ac;vertisine; expert, uoulcl be helpful. Arthur Godfrey >ms mentioned as possibly a valuable channel of communication reachin.o; a mass audience of certain levbls. sugr;ested the u. s. :i~8vy (Ci•iR) Special 'Devices Center, Sands Point, L. I., as a potentially V3luable or~::-nization to 2.ssist in such an educational program. The teachinc; techni4ue::- used by this ac;ency for aircraft identification c_urin[~ the pad 1mr 1-:a.s cited as an example of a similar educational tac-k. The Jam Hanciy Co. 'tvhich ma0e \'Jorlci :Jar II trc.:dninp: films (motion picture anci slide strips) Nas also sue;e;e::tec1, as well as :·:ralt Disney, Inc. animated cartoons. Dr. rlynek suggested that the amateur astronomers in the U. s. might be a potential source of enthusi- astic talmt "to spread the p;ospel 11 • It H<?s beJ_ieveci that busmess clubs, hip;h schoolE:, collep;e.s, and television st!'ltions vJOuld all be pleased to cooper<:1te in the shmTing of documentary type motion pictures if prepared in an interestjng manner. The use o£ true cases showing firct the "mystery" an(l then the 11 e~~planation 11 Hould be forceful. To plan and execute such a program, the Panel believed vJas no mean task. The current investip;atory r.roup 2.t ATIC uoulC:, of neceE-sity, have to be closely interra ted for support Hi th res:Ject to not only the ~~.,g ... ~ 'I:$~¥~~~~ -21- Approved For Release 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP81R00560R000100030027-0
Approved For R~~e· 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP81R00560R0<.0030027-0 -~~· ~c ct!' ±~"'~f'f-"eri'lw~!W!t> .. , historical cases but thEC current ones. Recent cases v.re probably much more susceDtible to explmation than older ones; first, because of ATIC' s c:periencc s anc:., secondly, their kno;rled;>:e of most plausible explanations. The Panel believed that some expansion of the ATIC effort wortld certainly be required to support such a program. It was believed ina1Jpropriate to state exactly hoH large a T;;b1e of Or~;anization -vmuld be required. Captain Ruppclt of ATIC unofficially propost:.d, for purposes of analyzing 2nd eva1uotinp; re:ports: a. P~ analysts' panel of four officers b. Four officer investiGators c. A briefinE: officer d. ii.n LDC liason officer e. A Heather 2nd balloon de.t··. officer f. An astronomic2.l consultant g. A Gro·t p LeaO.er, Hith ac'ministrative assist::'nt, file clerks and steno~!rapherE:. This pl~oposal met with eenerally favorable comment. The Panel believed that, 1dth A'J:'IC' s support, the educc.tionc-.1 proeram of 11 train-' inr ancl C.ebunking" OtJ.tl::_ned above nir,ht be required for a minimu...'ll of one and one-he1.lf to t1:-vo years. 1t.t the end of thj.s tim.e, the dene;er:: relc>.ted to 11 flyinc: saucers" shoulci have been r-reatly reduced if not eliminated. Cooperation from other railitar~r services cmc1 ap;encies concerned (e.l::•, Federal Civil Defense .l'.ctministr2tion) would be a necessity. In investigating siGDific2nt cases (such as the Tremonton, Ute>h, sie;htine;), controlled experin1Cnts might be required. .hn example ~~ I.99Qlll<~t~tt~f~ Approved For Release 2001/08/0 =2~- -RDP81R00560R000100030027-0
Approved For Reise 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP81R00560R.00030027-0 _......£j.; .• ~ .. ~~i,.,;~\\;!• f!f.<11~~~ would be the photograph:ing of "pillm·r ballooms 11 .;:tt different dist<mces under simila.r -vreather conditions 2.t the site. The help of one or t-vro psycholor;ists and 1vriters and a subcontractor to produce traming films vrould be necessary in addition. The Panel considered that ATIC 1 s efforts, temporarily e:;;:p~nded as necessary, could be most useful in implementing any action taken as a result of its recommendations. Experience and records in ATIC -vmuld be of value in both the pu_blic educational Md service training program envisaged. Dr. Robertson at least lJ<:~s of the opinion that after public gullibility lessentSC! and the service organizations, such as ADC, had been trained to sift out the more readily explained spurious sightinp;s, thE.re ~o·rould still be a role for a very modest-sized ATIC section to cope ui th the residuum of items of possible scientific intelligence value. This section should concentrate on energetically follot-rlng up (perhaps on the advice of qualified Air Force Scientific Advisory BoBrd members) those cases -vrhich seemed to indicate the evicience of unconventional enemy artifo.cts. H.eports of such artifacts woulci be expected to arise mainly from vJestem outposts in f['.r closer proximity to the Iron Curta~n than Luhhock, Texas 1 UNOI·Ji ICL'tL Hf\JtS'l'IGli'fiNG Gl~OUPS The Panel took coroniz2nce of ~he e'Xistence of such p;roups as the "Civilian Flyinc Saucer Investigators" (Los Angeles) and the 11 Lcrial Phenomena Research Orp,anization (Hisconsin). It 1-J.?s believed that such organizations should be Hatched because of their potentially -23- Approved For Release 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP81R00560R000100030027-0
Approved ;or ·~se 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP81R00560.0100030027-0 great influence on mass thinking if iudespread siehtines should occur. The apparent irresponsibility an6 the possible use of such groups for subvcrE"ive purposes shoulc~ be kept in mind. mc;~EfkSE IN NU1".il3F.R OF SIGHTINGS The consensus of the Panel Has, based upon the history of the subject, that the number of sightin9:s could be re.2.sonably expected to increase a~ain this summer. ~-~ Approved For Release13~~=~00560R0001 00030027-0 -24-
~ . Approved For RAse 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP81R00560R.100030027-0 ~~;j!,~""""' .3~~,m~fl·on REFORT OF THJ.:; SCIEl'::TII'IC PkNEL ON illHD:.j'JTIFTI;JJ FLYil\C OBJJ::C'l'0 Released in MORI Jan 17 1953 l. Purcu£1nt to the requert of the Lssistant Director for Scientific Intelligence, the unv.ersir;ned Panel of Scientific Consultcmtc h3s met to evalu<>.te cmy possible thre2.t to national security poced by Uni<ientified Flyin,ro; Objects ( HFlyin::', Sauccrs 1 '), <'nc"l to m<>.ke recor.uilE::nc~ntions thereon. The Panel has received the evidence 2s presented by coenizant L~telli- r;ence aeencies 1 primarily the Air Technical Intelli,:;ence Genter, anc has revieHed a selection of the best ClocUJilented incidents. 2. As a result of itrconciferetions, the Panel conclude~: a. Th2.t the evidence presenteci on Unidentified Flyinz Objects shovrs no indic.:1tion thc::t these phenomena constitute a direct physical threet to national security. ~:·e firmly believe th<:'.t there is no residuum of cases which indicates phenomena 1-Jhich an: attributable to foreign artifacts cape.ble of hostile acts, and. that there is no evi6ence that the phenomena indicate a need for the revision of current scicnti:':'ic concepts. 3. ~he Penel further concludes: a. Th;:-t the continued cr11phe.sis on the reportin[~ of these phenomena doe:=-, in these parlous times, reE"ult in a threat to the orderly functioninr-" of the protective organs of the body politic. ~Je cite ap examples the clogr,inp; of channels of communication by irrelevant reports, the danc;er of beinr. 1£ d by continued f<'1.lse alarms to ie;norc real Approved For Release 2~ii'RDP81R00560R000100030027-0
.. Approved For Aase 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP81R005601o100030027-0 ... -tt·'fJ'~~··q!. .... ,.._...,, Released in MORI -.-S~~JI;_,,_~£-~"'Jt<l+\':t' indications of hostile action, anc the cultiv.?tion of a morbid national fsycholop,y in which skillful hostile propc>.[;c>noa could induce hysterical ~\ 1rehavior v.nd harmful distrust of duly constituted authority. 4. In order most effectively to stren~then the national fa.cilities for the timely recopnition cnC: the ap-propri8te handling of true indications of hostile action, 2nd to minimize the concomitcmt dane;ers alluded to abo1-e, the Panel recommends: a. That the national security a~encies tc1.ke i.rnmedic:te steps to strip the UnidentifiE":d flying Objects of the special status they ha-,,c been [~iven anc'c the aura of mystery they have unfortunately c>CCft.'ired; b. Th2t the national security ar-;encies institute policies on intelli:-;ence, training, and public ed.ucation 6esiQ.ned to prepare the material defenses and the morale of the cotmtry to recognize most promptly and to react most effectively to true indications of hostile intent or action. ·~re sue;e;est that these sims may be .9chieved by an intee;rated program desiened to reassure the public of the total lack of evidence oi :inimic2l forces behind the phenomena, to tr2in personnelt to recocnize anc" reject false indications ouickly and effectively, and to strene;then regular channels for the evaluation of andprompt reaction to true :indications of hostile measures. /s/ Lloyd V. Derkner I ssoci2.ted Universities, Inc. ~/:-=s~/~I-~~ -~P~·;.....:r.:,;.o~b:..:e:.:;:r:..:t~s:-.:o:.:;n=--___,.--:::,.--~-....,.---, Chc? irm~n California Institute of Technology /s/ S. A. Goudsmit Brookhaven Hati('mal Labor2.tories /r::/ Luis ~-;. Alv~rez Unlli"ersity of California /s/ Thornton P2r:e Approved For Release 2001/08/07 :J~M\-~~~~BPJ>q§pftQq4,\qg,o30027-0