DoD Establishes AOIMSG, November 2021

Brief

Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks signed a memo on November 23, 2021, dissolving the Navy's UAP Task Force and standing up the Airborne Object Identification and Management Synchronization Group (AOIMSG) under the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, with an oversight council (AOIMEXEC) co-chaired by the Director of Operations, Joint Staff. The document frames UAP as simultaneously an intelligence and operational problem, explicitly states DoD lacks data to attribute incidents to foreign programs or advanced adversary technology, and draws a hard jurisdictional line against extraterrestrial investigation. A second updated card, dated December 9, 2021, adds messaging scaffolding tied to House passage of FY22 NDAA language mandating a formal UAP office. Several answers in the December card are redacted under FOIA exemptions (b)(5) and (b)(6), and one Q&A block on page 7 contains entirely blank bullet responses.

Metadata

Agency

U.S. Department of Defense / Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense

Release

2021-11-23

Type

PDF • .pdf

Length

7 pages

Classification

UNCLASSIFIED

Programs

AOIMSG, UAPTF, AOIMEXEC

Tags

UAP, Special Use Airspace, AOIMSG, UAPTF, AOIMEXEC, 2021, DoD policy, FOIA 22-F-0381

Key points

• DSD Hicks signed the AOIMSG establishment memo on November 23, 2021; the AOIMEXEC was created simultaneously to provide oversight of the new group.p.1
• ODNI submitted its preliminary UAP assessment to Congress on June 25, 2021, which confirmed the scope of UAP activity extends well beyond the Navy's purview and drove the decision to elevate management to the OSD level.p.1
• DoD acknowledged that not all objects in U.S. airspace are tracked or identified, particularly small objects that do not pose an apparent threat, and that the AOIMSG lowers the threshold for objects to be evaluated.p.2
• The selection of USD(I&S) and the Director of Operations, Joint Staff on the AOIMEXEC reflects the Department's characterization of the UAP problem as both an operational and intelligence matter.p.2
• The terminology shift from 'UAP' to 'airborne object' was deliberate: to destigmatize reporting by normalizing documentation of all airborne objects in Special Use Airspace, whether identified or not.p.3
• DoD explicitly stated that investigating extraterrestrial technology is outside the AOIMSG's mission, routing that question to other government entities such as NASA.p.3
• The December 9 card added messaging for the pending FY22 NDAA: the House-approved draft contained a section directing DoD and ODNI to establish a formal UAP office with defined organizational structure and authorities.p.4
• A full Q&A block on page 5 is withheld under FOIA exemption (b)(5), the deliberative process privilege, indicating internal policy debate was still unresolved at the time of the December card.p.5
• Page 7's Q&A section contains question headers but entirely blank bullet-point responses, suggesting the answers were either still being drafted or were withheld in full.p.7

Verbatim

• We currently lack the data to indicate whether UAP are part of a foreign collection program or indicative of a major technology advancement by a potential adversary.

  p.1

• There is not one single explanation for UAP.

  p.1

• Our approach has been — and will continue to be — driven by science and data.

  p.1

• Encounters with UAP are often brief and fleeting, and frequently involve a single source, such as a verbal report or a single photograph. We need more data and a better reporting structure — standardized reporting, timely reporting, and further reducing the stigma about reporting on UAP so that we have more reports for pattern and trend analysis.

  p.2

• The examinations into incursions by UAPs are still ongoing; we lack sufficient information in our dataset to attribute incidents to specific explanations.

  p.3

• It is not the purpose of the AOIMSG to look for evidence of extraterrestrials. Other parts of the government do that; for example, NASA looks for evidence of life on other planets.

  p.3

• The Department is committed to transparency with the Congress and the American people while balancing its obligation to protect classified information.

  p.6

Most interesting

• The PDF contains two entirely separate briefing cards, one dated November 23 and one December 9, 2021, with their own internal page numbering, suggesting they were bundled together in a single FOIA response packet.
• Author names on every page are redacted under exemption (b)(6), making it impossible to identify the Public Affairs staff who drafted the official DoD UAP talking points.
• The document candidly acknowledges that DoD was at that point managing a reactive, forensic data-collection problem, gathering information only after an event, and frames the AOIMSG's proactive posture as a corrective.
• The talking point 'There is not one single explanation for UAP' appears verbatim in both the November and December cards, signaling it was a pre-approved, centrally cleared phrase for public use.
• Special Use Airspace is defined by reference to 14 CFR Part 73, grounding the AOIMSG's jurisdiction in existing FAA regulatory language rather than creating a new legal framework.
• The December card includes a bracketed instruction, '[Prior to NDAA becoming law:] We're not going to comment on pending legislation', revealing the scripted, conditional nature of how DoD planned to handle congressional questions in real time.