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USCENTCOM Formation Track, Persian Gulf August 2020

DOW-UAP-D61, Mission Report, Persian Gulf, August 2020

A USCENTCOM MISREP covering a 21-hour AREC sortie over the Arabian Gulf on August 26-27, 2020, during which aircrew observed an unidentified formation of flying objects traveling along the Persian Gulf coast for approximately two minutes before cloud cover ended all tracking.

Brief

On August 27, 2020, at 1527Z, a 482nd Attack Squadron asset tasked to support NAVCENT ISR operations observed a formation of unknown flying objects traveling northeast to northwest along the Persian Gulf coast near grid 39RVM8. Tracking ran from 1527Z to 1529Z — approximately two minutes — before positive identification was lost in cloud cover and could not be regained. The mission's own weather entry explicitly labels it a 'UAP EVENT.' The intel gap for the mission was formally recorded as not filled.

Metadata

Agency
Department of War
Release
5/8/26
Incident
8/27/20
Location
Persian Gulf
Type
PDF • .pdf
Length
7 pages
Classification
UNCLASSIFIED (declassified)
Tags
formation, Persian Gulf, Arabian Gulf, 2020, MISREP-4685903, AREC, ANDAS4, coast-track-NE-NW

Key points

  • Aircrew formally recorded the event as 'FORMATION OF UNK FLYING OBJECTS' traveling NE-NW along the coast at 1527Z on August 27, 2020.p.6
  • Tracking lasted approximately two minutes (1527Z to 1529Z) before positive identification was lost in cloud cover.p.6
  • Aircrew was unable to regain PID on the formation after losing it in cloud cover.p.7
  • The official weather field on the ISR GENTEXT page explicitly uses the term 'UAP EVENT': 'LIGHT CLOUD COVERAGE PREVENTED CONT UOUS TRACKJNG OF UAP EVENT.'p.5
  • The 'Intel Gap Filled' field is recorded as 'No,' meaning the formation was never identified.p.5
  • FMV was collected during the mission and exploited by DGS 1, though no imagery or video is attached to this release.p.1
  • The aircraft was hailed on guard frequency by Iranian Air Defense at 0532Z; the encounter was rated 'PROFESSIONAL' in tone with no mission impact.p.6
  • Primary sensor was ANDAS4 (targeting pod); AH_GMESH was also available.p.4
  • The 21-hour mission accumulated 17.9 IMINT hours and 19.2 SIGINT hours, with the UAP observation recorded as a separate line event outside the primary taskings.p.1
  • Mission tasking included characterizing Iranian/IRGCN vessels, UAS activity, port activity, and establishing pattern of life in the Arabian Gulf.p.5

Verbatim

  • FORMATION OF UNK FLYING OBJECTS
    p.6
  • WAS TRACKING THIS FORMATION FOR APPROXIMATELY 2 MINUTES BEFORE PID WAS LOST IN
    p.6
  • CLOUD COVER. AIRCREW WAS UNABLE TO GAIN PIO AGAIN ON THIS FORMATION
    p.7
  • LIGHT CLOUD COVERAGE PREVENTED THE C I NTINOUS TRACKING OF THE FORMATION
    p.7
  • LIGHT CLOUD COVERAGE PREVENTED CONT UOUS TRACKJNG OF UAP EVENT
    p.5
  • FMV WAS ' EXPLOITED BY DGS 1.
    p.1

Most interesting

  • The military's own MISREP uses the phrase 'UAP EVENT' in a standardized weather field — not a narrative opinion, but a field entry — making this an unusually explicit official label for the incident.
  • Tracking was ended not by sensor failure or evasive maneuvering by the objects, but by ordinary light cloud coverage, suggesting the formation was at low-enough altitude or oblique-enough geometry to be obscured by partial overcast.
  • The observation occurred during the same sortie in which Iranian Air Defense hailed the aircraft on guard frequency — a geopolitically sensitive operational environment that adds context to the reporting threshold.
  • The 'Intel Gap Filled: No' entry is an official acknowledgment that the mission failed to identify what it observed.
  • FMV was collected and sent to DGS 1 for exploitation, meaning high-resolution full-motion video of the mission period may exist in classified holdings separate from this release.
  • The observation location (grid 39RVM8) places the formation in the Persian Gulf near the Iranian coast — the precise area the aircraft was tasked to monitor for IRGCN naval and UAS activity.
  • The method of observation field is redacted, leaving open whether the formation was detected electro-optically, on radar, via SIGINT, or some combination.

Cross-references

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