ISR Crew Tracks Fast-Moving Object, Gulf of Aden
DOW-UAP-D75, Mission Report, Gulf of Aden, July 2024
A U.S. Air Force ISR crew operating over the Gulf of Aden filed a SECRET MISREP documenting a single UAP observed at low altitude moving northwest faster than the observing aircraft, assessed as benign, and tracked until it outpaced pursuit.
Brief
On July 14, 2024, at 05:17Z, a 124th Attack Squadron ISR asset supporting NAVCENT over the Gulf of Aden observed a single UAP maintaining a straight, level flight path at low altitude during an active classified ISR mission. The UAP's speed exceeded that of the observing platform; the crew followed it until the distance grew prohibitive. No interrogation, engagement, or material recovery occurred. The observer — a TSGT/E-5 — assessed the object as benign, with propulsion means, intelligent control, and advanced capabilities all logged as unknown.
Metadata
- Agency
- Department of War
- Release
- 5/8/26
- Incident
- 7/14/24
- Location
- Gulf of Aden
- Type
- PDF • .pdf
- Length
- 8 pages
- Classification
- SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
- Programs
- AARO, NAVCENT, AFCENT, 609 CAOC, 432 AEW, 379 AEW, 132 Wing
- Tags
- straight flight path, low altitude, speed anomaly, Gulf of Aden, 2024, FMV sensor, MISREP, USCENTCOM, northwest trajectory, benign assessment
Key points
- UAP was first detected at 140517Z JUL 24 during an active NAVCENT ISR mission at grid 38P MT 53 [redacted] 17 [redacted], moving northwest.p.1
- The UAP flew a straight flight path at constant altitude, logged in the maneuverability field as 'STRAIGHT FLIGHT PATH AT SAME ALTI.'p.7
- UAP speed exceeded the observing aircraft's own flying speed — the sole explicitly noted anomalous characteristic in the report.p.8
- The crew followed the UAP until the distance became too great, suggesting the object maintained or accelerated its speed advantage.p.8
- Primary sensor for the mission was FMV (Full Motion Video), which was actively exploited during the mission; no sensor interrogation of the UAP was conducted.p.4
- Observer assessed the UAP as benign; no effects on personnel or equipment were reported.p.7
- UAP propulsion means, intelligent control status, and advanced capabilities were all logged as unknown.p.7
- No UAP material was recovered; no engagement was attempted; the interrogation field was marked NO.p.8
- Kinetic altitude was assessed as LOW, trajectory NW, with both first and last coordinates estimated rather than measured.p.8
- The report carries a declassification date of 20490714 — exactly 25 years after the incident — and was released to AARO on 2 June 2025.p.1
Verbatim
STRAIGHT FLIGHT PATH AT SAME ALTI
p.7UAP'S SPEED WAS FASTER THAN THE 1.4a, 1.4g FLYING SPEED
p.81.4a FOLLOWED THE UAP TILL THE DISTANCE BECAME TOO FAR TO FOLLOW
p.8WEATHER WAS NOT A FACTOR
p.5UNKNOWN ABOUT ADVANCED CAPABILITIES AND/OR MATERIALS
p.7UAP Effects on Equipment: NONE
p.8Observer Assessment of UAP: Benign
p.7
Most interesting
- The UAP was observed during an active classified ISR mission — not a casual patrol — meaning the crew had high-grade FMV sensor equipment running at the moment of contact.
- Two separate grid coordinates track the UAP's displacement: it first appeared at 38P MT 53 [redacted] 17 [redacted] and last appeared at 38P MT 22 [redacted] 49 [redacted], both with a radius of uncertainty of 5 units, indicating meaningful distance covered.
- Despite FMV running throughout the mission window and the UAP in view, the interrogation field is marked NO — the crew observed but did not actively probe the object with any sensor.
- The declassification date of 20490714 places full public release 25 years post-incident, well past standard 10-year review windows, indicating the original classification authority considered this operationally sensitive material.
- The report was released as SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY, meaning it was shared with all Five Eyes intelligence partners — the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand — before AARO received it.
- The observer was a Technical Sergeant (TSGT/E-5), an enlisted ISR operator, not a pilot — consistent with remotely piloted aircraft operations typical of the 124 ATKS mission profile.
- The MISREP form includes dedicated fields for UAP event serial number, UAP Date of DoD Acquisition, and UAP Anomalous Characteristics, indicating AARO has standardized UAP reporting into routine ISR paperwork.