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my knowledge, upon my personal review of information available . .... '\ I .- \ ~ ; <t": CIVIL ACTION NO. BO-1562 roved. f o Plaintiff _Defendant v. AFFIDAVIT OF EUGENE F. YEATES 1.. I am the Chief, Office of Policy, of the National Eugene F. Yeates, being duly sworn, deposes and says: UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA from the plaintiff for the Court's in camera consideration. information which is not available in the public realm and which specifically identifies the NSA records being withheld requests, in support of the Agency's Motion for Summary Judgment. CITIZENS AGAINST UNIDENTIFIED FLYING OBJECTS SECRECY 2. I submit this affidavit regarding all records that have been ~ocatedby the BSA pursuant to the plaintiff's ForA To supplement this testimony, I will execute an additional affiBavit, classified TOP SECRET, to provide highly classified to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) for NSA records. . to me in my official capacity, and upon conclusions reached in responsible for processing all initial requests made pursuant accordance therewith. Complaint in this case. The statements herein are based upon State Of Maryland ) ) SSe County Of Anne Arundel) Security Agency (NSA). As Chief, Office of Policy, I am NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ----------------) ':- . .~. -'. · "., ,..... : ., y: .. ( .... : " ,' .. '~ -- ::~«".: : '; ... ; ........ · ..". ':." ...... ':.'. · .~ '.' . '.
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, '. 2 THE REI. EVANT DOCUMENTS is attached to the Complaint as Exhibit C. A true and correct I copy is also attached to this affidavit ~s Exhibit 1.) are classified in their entirety, and exempt from release under . -.~~~ ~:.: ... ~ ., ··.i~_·.;' . ~ " ;fo the NSA records that had been referred to this Agency by CIA .' .. -....... were exempt from release under 5 U.S.C.S 552(b)(1) because they Roy R. 'Banner, thief, ~olict Staff, advised Mr. Gers~en that·~· litigation concerning information pertaining to UFOs. attorney of record in the CIA litigation) was the referral of the documents to this Agency. attorney for the plaintiff, Peter A. Gersten filed a request with NSA for the eighteen do~~ents- in his own name on December 22, -1978 •. In a letter dated 'January 9, '1979; - . . . - . • I .' .. ~~ .•. located by CIA. The NSA also received two other referrals from . :~t~='~j'~~ CIA on December 4, 197B which provided three additional NSA . ,. -c , ~ documents. Subsequently by Saucer Watch v. CIA, D.D.C'- 17B-859.) .: ~}~~~ :i;~ ....... ''''l'~ ..•. ~ .~ . -; .. ':1~: -.~;;; 3. This Agency received four separate referrals (described '; .:.3 '.: ;",.;: v. !.... .~. below') from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) concerning'NSA~'~ • -f" i'~ ·:f~". . . ..... ! -'.,;~." :.~.~ documents located by that Agency when 1t was engaged an FOIA ",~~~~ ,-;,;;t . '. . . S;:t.-;~;'::1 _ .. ~ (Ground :.'/: .i·'C~: .;:. • 'I '.- • r. :." y .• ~(~ The first was on Noven;b~'r:':~ .. ", '. . '. ':' ..; ~! <: .... 9, 1~7B when this Agency received copies of· fifteen Agency documen 4. By letter dated January 29, 1979 Mr. Gersten appealed Ii the denial of the documents referred by the CIA. (A copy I of this letter is attached to the Complaint as Exhibit D. A i true, and correct copy of this letter (less enclosures) is also II attached to this affidavit as Exhibit 2.) On .1arch 2" 1979 1\ the NSA Freedom of Information Act/ Privacy Act Appeals Authority ! affirmed the denial of the request for release of the information II II I · 5 U.S.C. S 552(b)(3) because they are exempt from release by 18 C.S.C. S 798, 50 U.S.C. S 403(d)(3) ~nd Section 6 of I! Public Law 86-36 (50 U.S.C. 402 (note». j '~A copy of this ~etter I I .1 II I I II I I ,I r J 'jl " ~i " l' ,II II 11 .) , 11 d 'i .. , I \
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',:': ..: ::. ~ . .., t.' . A true 'and correct copy (A copy of this letter is that the information is classified in i.e., On February 16, 1979 plaintiff in the instant case, 5,. on the same grounds, , "\ its entirety and therefore exempt from release under 5 U.S.C.· ,:':::~.:J './~:: is also attached to this affidavit as Exhibit 3.) and Section 6 of Public Law 86-36. attached to the Complaint as Exhibit E. li<:' , E=-~. ~~" ~~,-. f?'" ~~,:. ' ~-5i' , ~; f:"~'f") 5 552(b)(1) and that the information is exempt from release unde~ ~'.'. ,;;- '.:", 'le"', , 5 U.S.C. s 552(b)(3) for the reason that other statutes prevent , "'.' i,;,.. .. its disclosure, to wit: 18 U.S.C. § 798, 50 U.S.C. S 403(d)<'3}·. F,;i." "":"'. ~" .... ," Sft:., , .1 ~, .. ' ,'" " ~r~, <, . \. 1J? by counsel, filed an rcrx request with NSA for all docum~nts, ':'~\ . it.i.:' ,,;', in possession or under the control of NSA relating to UFOs :';"~':':',/::':.'~ .';.~.~ I~{ ':. .",-. r. -; ,,:~ . ~"' t4 ~/ and the UFO phenomena. (A copy of this letter is attached ,to '::";","'" :.. : ~!;: ,... :.: .: ..:~. ,:';':':,I,L the Complaint as Exhibit F. A copy is also attached hereto and --:' :;5~ f(i; :::::: ':::::::d4:~0 ::c:::::: :::::nJ::~a::o::'0:9::: :::u~i;~:;;.t '[~ ~ : .. :-:0: .. ,;.!.~ ~~. deletions of information exempt under the provisions of 5 . ,·:·:o;~~:.!,;:;i:~' .. ,.~ I\% ' :·:;:~··~,,·;·t:·~ ." ·:~c tl~ .. .: U.S.C. s 552(b)(1) and (b)(3) were taken prior to that rel~a~e.~;~ >};j' ~. Plaintiff was also advised in this letter that other NSA,:./\~~;.): ;~:,I~l documents existed but were exempt from release und~r 5 U,S:C' -". s.:. j c_.~ I f~; 552(b) (1) because they are classified in their errt r r e cy r exempt ,:' ~;'.' - .'. . ,~~. from release under 5 U.S.C. 5 552(b)(3) because disclosure of ~ '. :.: .. ~~1· . themwas prohibited by 18 U"S'C~ 5798, 50 U.S.C. 5 403(d)(.3~;>·~'~':J.:.i ~l1 .. Publl.c Law 86-36; exempt from d a s c Lo su r e under 5 U.S.C. 5·':·,.'~;;'~';-!:i.; ,:~,~ ~~ •. ''. '~~j.:':",~. ~~~-:::. ff~' 552 (b) (5) because they are intra agency memoranda, or letters ~ .•. > ::;~ ff;;. which would not be available by law to a party other than ~'~:~':"::i~;J .~ ~: , ,'~'" ,t -.h , .... , m. " agency in Ii tiga tion wi th this Agency; ·or exempt under 5 U. S:';~:~~i /~~ ~ ..'. § SS2(b) (6) because they are to personnel or similar files the ',0: e , .:-. ~". -£ ;:':f;~: ::t~:i~ Q~~~ . -. disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarrante~ ... ,.:::~\,~~:~ "~1 ~~':' >.',:;' ':.::, invas inn nf personal privacy. (A copy of this 1 e t ter is ~tt;;;~e;. ..". ~. '.' ........ to the Complaint as Exhibit G. A true and correct copy is :"~~'>:;j. r~"~;; I,'" ,,":.:, ,_, also attached to this affidavit as Exhibit 5.) .The Jan~a~Y ;{:.f..:if~ ,~\:i g .... letter also advised the plaintiff that certain l.nformatl.on, ::.".'': , .... pot:: 3:;f~N;~ I· .~. :':~:l: .. ~~i:~ 1.:? ~ , :.:, r:', &'.' ~.' .•••. I " i I I Ii I I I , I II \: I; I' I' ,I II I' I; i: " I. I' 1I Ii I: II l' I: I: Ii 1\ - Page 5born-digital extraction
4 .,' ~:: . .. '.. .: : . : ~ -' ·.:·I~~'.:- (A of '... I I I 'By A total of seventy-nine A true and correct copy is also (The fourth and final CIA referral.) (A copy of this letter is attached to An additional NSA document was referred to the NSA' by , By letter dated January 23, 1980, plaintiff ~ppealed S 552(b)(3) because disclosure of it was prohibited by 18 THE STATUS AND MISSION OF NSA 9~ NSA was established by Presidential Directive in 6. 7. is attached as ~xhibit 8.) referred to the originating agency. 8. Finally, a portion of a document which is respon:ive . I to the plaintiff's request was rece~tly declassified and released documents were referred to various agencies for their direct originating with other Federal agencies or components would be to counsel for the plaintiff by letter dated September 15, 1980. the CIA on July 27, 1979. October 1952 as a separately organized Agency within the Department of Defense under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense, who was designated by the President as Executive Agent of the Government for conducting response to plaintiff. the Complaint as Exhibit K. tion Act/Privacy Act Appeals Authority affirmed the denial attached to this affidavit as Exhibit 7.) plaintiff's request for release of information on the same the denial of the information referred by CI~ and the subsequent grounds as cited above. (A true and correct copy of this letter less the enclosure . . reply letter dated March 24, 1980, the NSA Freedom o~ Informa- , referral by again advising Mr. Gersten that this record is true and correct copy of this letter is attached as Exhibit 6.) In a letter dated December 19, 1979, Mr. Banner responded to the exempt from release under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) because it was denial of ·his general FOIA, request of February:16, 1979. classified in its entirety, and exempt from release under 5 U.s.C. u.S.C. § 798, 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) and Public Law 86-36. I, , , I ,I Ii II j; 11 ii Ii I i I! ., II Ii II I I I !. , :1 - " i, '\ .. ' . ",
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their representatives are carried. of signals intelligence activities. 5 11. signals transmitted on a given day is vast. for sending and receiving international radio communicatio~~ ••. !~.:~.;r_ addition to or instead of its own government facilities. ···'··~·~>~~r·· (International radio communications as used here includes ':"<:';:1,' ,:: communications passed at least in part by wire.) This i~~~~~~~:;1:2: the foreign government's use of the facilities of an international ~~ communications common-carrier which is also available fo~'~;~~'~;':~{?HI~ . ;::. ':':i:; ;'~'7:. . ",'"' by the public. such common-access carriers supply the means by"~:;·.:;'71 which more than half the encrypted. and plain text radio ~~~mt;!:l .~. ca tions of foreign governments, foreign organiza tions, and:" :~~t~~~l· ~l .. ~~;.:...:. ,.' : i;t c .. .... :t~~~1~~ :} '.-" .•..• ~'.:",~~:'~ •. ~.'. ....;,~fo It is common knowledge that the total volume of radio 'l~~ ..... : ..": .';'~.~: ·J.;~I ].",~ It is also gen~r~UX .;.;.'~~ · ..': :; ~~~;.~~! ./~ known that radio transmissions can be received by anyone". :'~~:::-~:r,{..~ :.~~ ':.~~~.~ • '. : : r ".. ~ -. ,;ftr '.:' :·~·~:;;~f;~i~~ /~:~£.' .: ·:·~\.:?~t~~~ ~ . .. ;... ... ~.: .. \ . .:~~~. :~ ". ' ~ ::;;;'..:.~::';,': net" communications. A foreign government may use other means .~ ... , ,.-::..:..;.:~ ... COMIN~ reports and will be addressed separ~tely. .. " .... .~' . -. ".i.;:~~~ ~l~ the communications security activities and signals intelligen~e;~(~ activities of the United States. A primary signals intell~g~~~~A~ . . '~~"I.;7 v: ~.~ -l'~~ (S~GINT) mission of NSA is to intercept radio communications' t~ ~~~ , ':':":'J~-:,--:~:~ sent to or from foreign governments in order to obtain foreign ~q ~;..~ · '::::~"::!;~f~~ :;:H in telligence information necessary to the national defense, -~'.~.~-:.:.;:.:. national secur ity, or the conduct of foreign affairs. Th~·.:!:'fl!f~~:~ '. ;:~~~~.4:l~~"~ intelligence information derived from the intercept of fore1.gn·'''' :J>01 ·-t·~····~ communications is called communications intelligence .(COMINT):~~\! ~~~ .... : .. .-.. ~ .. '.,;..', "'.. : .::.~.:"':..:!': .':~,,:; Of the NSA records at issue in this case, only four are not ~~~~~~ .~~ . .. .~~~:..::::. '~':'.~:'. ......... ..~"! All of the '':;:-;~2 -:~: . ,...;. :~·~·jk;)· .~:.~~ remaining records sought in this civil action are the product (~,~.~ .;. "1~~ L,.... .01' ". :.:"::':'::~~;'.;-; ;...:".;; " ; .~~./.~!:ff~.i:!il :;72 . 10. These COMINT activi ties include the. targeting of .~~:;~:~7t~I?:: :~:';: ... - .. '~ ~ ~.l foreign governments' communications both within their borders. :--:?~ ~ ... :-:: ,-~: .: .~: "'~:~ /':·:f ,~. ~ J;: and to and from communicants abroad involving the use of their .: ~ ~:.:::-~ · . :::', ,~ .. ~.:~.i' .~~\;~ own radio transmitter and receiver facilities not available for' '':{';: ... ;,,:"f~;~,~i .. _:~.; r .... : public use. Such communications links are known as agovernme'nt .-: ~1~ j. : ~ I' " II I: " I' i, Ii i: il ,; i' I! '\ I! , I ! ..... .. '" . '." ". , : roo. ~: :. ' .: "': .. ". ' ,. -. i .. " . ~ ... - .-. . ,:'r ,-:::' . ;:. ", f; . ... : ", '. " ~ , r ' L . .. ~ .::,;.: <: '~. ".' .,:.r. .. " I - Page 7born-digital extraction
.'!" - . : 6 that "government would be expected to take immediate steps to '~)"',7: ',''';~ . :~'.::: : .".".:- .~ .!. defeat that capability. This can be accomplished in a number. iJ;~~':':d . .,.~·.i~~Y~~~.: ;7~· of ways. A foreign government might shift to communications .:·:·;rr· .:;.: : ..:. <:~:(l~~:~~: "~: .~i;,~~ .~ " .. " -~ ... ~ ..... '1 '1 ~., .. <S;,~~~·~ .', .!.'.~ is a prima~y mission of the NSA. communications is generally known. with any reasonable amount of personnel and equipment. I ~ i; r: 'I I i I I I 1. I' " .1 II II ,. t, tti ... f~' ~:"~.' . ~ .. ,:.; .' :::r::;:: :::e~ro:::S :e::~v:::t e::::m::: ::n t::t::::k:t P:::: o '~:d '.~ f'~"'~'~~L~':" •. : .•..... :., .•.••.. : .•. ; ...•.•...•.. ~.: .•.• ; .•. ~.: .•. so, too, a s ~t nown to ..... f1 :~* "':. foreign offici.'s that such .interception of radio communica.~~.~.~;J"t~ .I.;., .. ;.: :.· ·.'J .. ::.. ;-.· •• Foreign officials may be ':'.;: ~H~., :fi~ _ expected to know, ~lso, that NSA cannot possibly intercept eV~~:~f';,:; &'~ ':. ~. ". ~~ ~:f: .:- ." a significant percentage of all such communications, espeCiaIIY.·~·:~:~ taking account of the fact that NSA's activities involve: .: <~:~~~.::~; :\~ worldwide communications, not solely those having a United . '.:::;)). ,j~ States terminal. The number is simply too vast to be handled" ;;S :'~j! ." "_:.f. ~ .. ~~.;:~ ~',~~ Moreover~ :'::~ ...... ; .a:.; ..... ':', ~ ... :: ~:i: the cost and effort of such interception would be disproportiori~1:~~ ate _t:2~he ,:::::~i::n:: :::~: ::r:::n r:::::::gence. target~~.,~~ i presumably know well' -- NSA must focus its interception ac·tivi-.;,~~ .,:,-::~ . -' '. - ... ': : -. ; ... ",~-I·~;;~' ;~;~ .ties on those particular communications lines,- channels, links '.J~' .;~1 . .' '::'.~~ .j:.i. ... ··4,:; or systems which yield the highest proportion of useful foreigri··:~ ~·:~t . '-. '.; .. ~' :.~:~, - ... ,~~ intelligence information. What foreign government official~ }:.;~.:.;-=:t~ not know, however, is which of the vast numbe~ of radio commun.~:~·I"(:: cations NSA attempts to intercept, which are intercepted, and, ',' I ~ .. ~,.':". : ~.: I! of those that are intercepted, which yield. to NSA procesSing.:-, <~.::. ) .1 methods and techniques. It is the protection of this critical ,.~: .:';': •• I : ..': . ~~~:! .~:.;~ ;,[r "information that is at the heart of the instant ~ase •. ,·:,:.);;~t~::i1 j li ! 13. The continued efficacy of NSA' s vi tal ~ntell~g~~C~,;·./:t$3:' ~i~{ activities requires that the lines, channels, links and systems -; ~'i':'; II actually monitored remain ~~iden·tified.jf a foreign gO~:~'~i;~i~ ij \1 obtains suffic"fe'nt reason to suspect that NSA is able to' <~'.t~~i§: :~~ intercept and process that government's radio communications,' '.::~~ •. ~.: '.~. :.:: ' .. ~ .: ... .,,: '. "...... ~ =.'-- ...... .' · .. · ...... ~ .' . ... ~: " .~. .....: :.~ .. ." ". . , · .- .:.... '. ". ." . . ~.';-'" pO:. ,-'I ", -. ;.'.J.'.: .:.".::'-; ·. .' ~ .- .' '. ":".1 .. ·.1 - .. . ~. ".. -. I - Page 8born-digital extraction
interest. The manner in which NSA does this selection and the source is lost unless and until NSA can establish a new and .;: : -". ," ., .', .." . .... :: . ~:. ~ . I Tori I ,. I i I ! Information about these subjects been released to the pUblic. would enable foreign observers to further assess, and thus take 7 "/-. 15. Even after targeting only a small proportion of about which virtually no authoritative information has ever to the national security but also impose a heavy burden on the to establish a new and equivalent intercept and the source is communication channel believed to be targeted by NSA can may possess the technical capability to either upgrade or interception operation, all of the intelligence from tha~ equivalent intercept. The risk involved is great. The infor- initiate cryptography to secure its communications. Finally, a links the U.S. cannot intercept. It may also choose to use alternate methods of communications. The foreign governments limited resources of NSA which must attempt to recover the old thus is faced with a considerable task in selecting out those \ messages that will be reviewed for pos~ible intelligence. the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State and other f policymakers. Obviously, if a ~OMINT source used by the Agency becomes unavailable, policymakets must operate without the . information that source produced. Sometimes it is impossible mation produced by NSA includes political, economic, scientific and military data which is of im~easurable value to the Presiden~ I degree of reliability and success its methods enjoy are SUbjects lost permanently. Those losses are not only extremely harmful all available electromagnetic communications for interception, , . . the number of n~ssages intercepted is extremely large. NSA source or establish an equivalent source of information. 'be used by a foreign government to pass misleading information. 14. If a foreign power is successful in defeating an o· I: t , I! '. !; !. !i !: , ,; ~ I :i ;. '. r " '. ! ~ ; t ; i: p " ~ ! \ i ~ ;, j: I'. :\ r: I. i! ,. " I, t • I: I' ,. r : I: !: i: " I' i, r : " ,. " r: ! I, I' I! " ': i, :t II Ii " I I I' n II ~ I P l: Ii ;, I i, _jESSiE] j£ 2 ELI, £ 2212",122£ .ZWU UU.C 2 JSJ ; ttJSi 52iU.ibU &I.e • ,
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inferences and make assessments about this nation's COMINT take counter-measures, as described above, to defeat the them would' permit foreign intelligen~e officials to draw collection and processing activities that would enable them to ~ ~, ~ .. ~1~ ~. ~~' ,- : \0 •• ~i~· " li~ , ",~ ~' B: p' ~: , I : .. ;; .' ' .... : . s: I<lit f " ~,:: . ,~ ~: f# : ~, : ~~' };::.. .. '(I~ .. I~~ t:~, ~ ... ~ r.i . lor, J, r~ ~~ ..... ~¥: .. I~~~. C,r,of. . ;:;.:~ •• :0' i~ ~~ f·":' ~}1' r·' ;r~ r~ ,~, ~ k lY.' - ~ u;~· r:.{ ,-' ~: . ~~- I!> ' ~.,t ~;;: ~1. ~~~. , I?: ~~' .~~ ~ " ~"- -'! .- ~~ . ~~~: . : tiiiJ ~., .",.. ~~, : f' , ~1; " " ffi' " : L' ~~ 1'\, pI. .. " IIi:J w,' }~ .. ~- .. ;..J. 1}~': ~, " ~: f.'~ r.- ~ I 6', RELEASE OF COMINT REPORTS COMINT reports being withheld from the plaintiff channels, links, and sys~ems targeted and intercepted and NSA's -I capa~ilities to successfully process the underlying communica- I tions. These communications targets and the processing techniques! are, current intelligence sources and methods. __ Disclosing . . " gence purposes. No meaningful portion of any of the records could be segregated and released Without~entifYing the communications underlying the communications intelligence repo~~~j Also disclosed would be the communications lines, classification to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which could res~lt in exceptionally grave damage to the nation, 17. The COMINT reports being withheld from the plaintiff such as ,the ·compromise of ••• intelligence operations ••• vi tal 'to the national defense.· Other documents were properly classified Secret pursuant to Executive Order 10501, Section sources and methods. When originated, certain of the recosds were properly classified Top Secret pursuant to Executive Order , 10501, Section lea), providing Ifor the application of that capabilities of NSA's intelligence gathering techniques. disclosure of these records would identify the communications steps to defeat, the capabilities of NSA's intelligence gathering l(b), providing for the application of that classification to , information, the unauthorized 1isclosure of which could result in 'I I that had been successfully intercepted and processed for intelli- I - II II I I 11 /I 11 1! r 11 l! I I I I are all based on intercepted foreign communications. The ~ ~ !; ;j techniques. I: . ' .~~ 16. The I - Page 10born-digital extraction
for classification in Section 1-3 of Executive Order 12065, and Each COMINT record was appropriately marked when it was origi- .. : . '.;;: 'e ..", .... , . -' " .. :, ~', _~i .; . The . . ..... ~~~~~. / ... of. :?~~.~;. ........... ". These cOMINT records meet the criteria Each cOMINT record and each portion thereof remains information revealing important intelligence operations." serious damage to the nation, such as by "compromising ••• lCA), providing for the application of that classification to classified because of the damage their unauthorized disclos~re. .. •. ~ \. ~.': !:=.' !Ii would reasonably be expected to cause to communications in~elli~,~ ,~ . ~\.::.,t..-::,::. .~.~ gence activities of the United States Government. Because they .. :.::~~ ':~.0:;1 are properly classified und:r Executive Order 12065. the ;~?~~ l! :··~~~~~rt%.;t! .~ : .. ;~." " - classified TOp Secret pursuant to Executive Order 11652, Section rest, which were originated after June 1, 1972, were properly information, the disclosure of which could resuI~ in exceptionally they are properly classified 'dthin the categories provided-'- in Section 1-1 of the Order. I have reviewed all of the COM IN; . I records being withheld from the plaintiff for possible declassi- properly so classified. In conducting this ':~:~~~.';:.~ \ . review, I weighed the significant ne~d for openness in governmen~ . ,"; :.:~I·~~~"~·':.:! .. ~'--'.:";~ against the likelihood of damage to our national security at .~·cf'f:i(.' ··:~.~·· .. !JJ.~."':··:t/ this time and determined that the records should continue to be,,':..;.; . ..~.-:;:~ ~~~ ~\ classification to information, the unauthorized disclosure na ted. . .. 3-1 and 3-3 of Executive Order 12065 and I find each portion of ,~ :.. . " .• _: v ;·;~··'l each record remains properly classified and thetefore exclu~.e,~.",.:~.± fication or downgrading according to the provisions of Sections 11652,' Section I(B), providing for the application of that from declassification or downgrading. which could result in serious damage to the national security, ,I~~ .. .~ .. : :: ~""~~l ".I~ sucfi ~s the revelation of significant intelligence operations. 't '. tI 'I ji d Ii ,- I' ,I il 'I I, I, I' 'I Ii " I' fl I: II IJ " I! \ I! \I il 'J h " II I ! ! I I I Ii d I' (I II, II I I , I I I ! I I .. ; . ~ ..',' -.', . r- , . -~. e , ".:' .: .. ..... -, ~ . .. :- ".. '~'.' :".;
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Public Law 86-36, 18 U.S.C. § 798, and by Section 103{d)(3) of ., records are exempt from disclosure pursuant to 5 U.S.C.§552(b) (1)'.: ~~r .. r..~ J -. t~ :~.:'.: ~,':\ W·:····,· d~« ~ ....... " ;;!: ~.<>, "I;'; ~, ~. :.:. o ~;~ ~ .... , : .. : ~~ .: ..'; ~ '~ .~ .. ::'. .~, ,:;, O{. . . ;;L:: t.~~ f: '. : ~~' .. ! t=~: l';; ~ .' ~% '11 ~~ . I ~! .' .. . ~ ~ ..... . of ••••• ~ '. ~" ".: ~L~:.: '::, '~ .' ~.,:::):: •• o I~{>-· ~ ~ j .: .: .. . ". '" \' .. ". r-: . '.: . I i I ! I i Moreover, Public disclo- Accordingly, it was determined (See paragraphs 11 through 15 above.) .--_ ... ~ele~se of the COMINT records being withheld from 18. 10 that would be seriously jeopardized by the disclosure plaintiff the reports that identify the intelligence sources and methods tive content of the documents but also on the characteristics of exemptions (b) (1) and (b)(3) are not based only on the subs tan- its functions and thereby jeopardize the intelligence collection information about the nature of NSA's activities including COMINT records and the withholding of them pursuant to FOIA 1947 (50 U.S.C. s 403(d) (3». taining to intelligence sources and methods protected from the disclosure of these classified records or of specific -infor~ mission of the Agency. tion of them would also compromise classified information per- disclosure by Section 103(d){3) of the National Security Act of of that singular mission would reveal certain functions and This mission of the NSA is singular and unique. of the United States. The disclosure. of these records or any por- activities of the NSA which are protected from disclosure by S 798 prohibiting the unauthorized disclosure of classified Section 6 of Public Law 86-36, 50 U.S.C. S 402 (note). sure of specific information about the records in the context matiun about them would reveal information protected by 18 U.S.C. I I I i info rrna tion concernin·g. the communications intelligence act'ivi ties' ! that the COMINT records are exempt from release under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (3) of the Freedom of Information Act because each portion the National Security Act of 1947. 19. It should be noted that the classification of these of each record is protected from disclosure by Section 6 ~f the I· I' " 1 1 " the plaintiff or any portion of any of them would disclose II I' I' I! I! II l I I II 'I Ii II l! II .\1 II ·Ii il n r !l II I! ! , . ' I .' 1 I : I .. .i 'I .. ! ~ '; I ~ ij .. : - . .. ';': - - .• ' .", .~.:,,=-- .": ... .... < " .-:- . .i : :;r .. : {'," .:.~: I - Page 12born-digital extraction
., 'j i J :1 - :J ./ . • 1 'I 'i I ! I -.~ I , I . I I -\ I seeks. That is, all of the COMINT reports at issue here (with one exception)' are based on messages which were intercepted from government net communications systems. (See paragraph 10, above. Moreover, almost all of these messages were enciphered when originally transmitted. Thus, release of any portion of the sUbstantive .. message would not only risk identifying the ability of NSA to intercep.t a particular line of communications but would also risk revealing the capability of NSA to read a foreign government's enciphered messages. Similar harm 'would result from the disclosure of any material that might help to identify the communications intercepted by· NSA, such as infor- mation about date, time, origin or manner of transmission or receipt. Also, the revelation of the substantive content of the reports would allow foreign officials to determine which channels or types of communications are being monitored. The public disclosure of either the content of the reports or of any identifying characteristics would have the same adverse conse- quences on the communications intelligence activities of the United States. All such information relates to classified communications intelligence functions of NSA that have not been pUblicly disclosed by the Agency in any other conte~t. RELEASE OF NON-COMINT RECORDS 20. Three of the four non-COMINT records at issue here were released in large part, with certain deletions. On~ of these records was withheld in its entirety. These documents are: a. A document entitled UFO Hypothesis and Survival Questions which ~as prepared by an Agency employee. The --_.- entire report has been released except for the name and or- ganization of the preparer of the document. This is not a COMINT report and contains no reference to SIGINT activities. It is a draft of a monograph that was located in an Agency 11
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.. " .' , .. I' i: ;: i. " ': o!: I; I I " i ~ I! ~ : :' " , i " I: I I, I I: I: I: Ii ,! I, I i: !i I' I' ., ; '. I, I, ii Ii II file where it had been retained for historical reference purposes. The deletion was made pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) which provides that the FOIA does not apply to matters that are specifically exempted from disclosure by statute. The applicable ~tatute in this instance is Section 6 of Public Law 86-36 which specif~cally exempts from disclosure the names and titles of NSA employees. b. The second non-COMINT document is a memorandum which discusses the UFO phenomena as the author believes they may r~late to the intelligence community. ,This document was released with deletions of the descriptive references to the COMINT operations of the Agency. The deletions contain informa~ tion -which I have determined ,to be curr~n!-ly and prop_erly classified and, thus, exempt from disclosure under 5 U.S.C. ! S 552(b)(I). _ Portio~s of the material deleted also ~oncern i .information witr respect to the organization and operational, activities and functions of NSA which are exempt from disclosure pursuant to 5 U.S.C"S 552(b)(3) which provides that the FOIA does not apply to matters that are specifically exempted from disclosure by another statute. Section 6 of Public Law 86-36 provides that no law shall be construed to require disclosure of the organization or any function of the NSA or any information I with respect to the activities thereof. Moreover disclos~re of I i this information would reveal information protected by 18 I u.s.c. §798 which prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of classified information concerning COMINT activities and by the National secur1iy Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. S403(d)(3» which prohibits the disclosure of information pertaining to intelli- gence sources and methods. A portion of this document was deleted pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(S) because it represe?ts this employee's expression of opinion on how the topic relates 12 , ,. ~'. -, -: . -'. '. .. '; ",
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my review today I have ascertained, however, that this memorandum 13 is neither in whole nor in part responsive to the plaintiff's , .'.' ~ . .... ' .:' '. :~ ..:... ' .....:. f·· ... ~' •..... :" I. . . The final non~COMINT record is a report which It does not deal with UFOs or the UFO phenomena. d. request. portions of the record contain no reference relating to UFOs or UFO 'phenomena and are, therefore, not responsive to plaintiff's attorney, (See Exhibit 8, attached hereto). The remaining UFO symposium. It is the assignee's personal account of his c. The third non-COMINT document is a memorandum for to the mission of the Agency. This deletion is non-factual and to report an incident that occurred during his attendance at a request. ~ctivities and does not include reference to any UFO sighting or its entirety pursuant to 5 U.S.C. S 552(b)(5) and (b)(6).· In the record by an NSA assignee that was originally withheld in request. for the reason that it is not within the scope of plaintiff's closure under 5 U.S.C. S552(b)(l) and (b){3) is being withheld a portion of this record in addition to being. exempt from dis- Rather, it is a document voluntarily prepared by the assignee Ii ph~nomena • .i / lj Ii! \ was addressed in paragraph 8, above. The portion of the record I responsive to this FOIA request has been released to plaintiff's I; p r Ii !: .' " I, I I; i: p I: 'I I, .; I' " does not represent finalized Agency policy. It includes the kind of an~lysis, frank comment and recommendations, which· an agency must encourage and protect from public disclosure to avoid a chilling effect upon free and candid internal discussions in I: support of optimum decision making wi thin the Agency. Finally, II .1 Ii il .~.- . : .~. . ..... .' .,' . .- . :~. .... .. \ . ·:.r .!{ .. ~ , . . ~ ~ ....:..' -.~ . : ..• ~ .. . " :'.~ . .:: . I - Page 15born-digital extraction
'." '.. ':.' ..... : ... . :'. -.' . , ~ .~ ..' .. " .. . :~:.~.. :.' i i ! '.' I • ! ..... : _---:~~~e.11J e.u t "-I EU NE F. Y~ES Chief, Off1ce of Polley . NSA . -. -- ... ':~.'-' . :: ' ... , 21. Further information about the records or portion's:'. thereof being withheld is contained in the in camera affidavit executed by me. Subscribed and sworn to" before me this ~~~ay of September 1980. I' I. t:' ;! ., " . '. ,. I' :, I' I: ! ~ \! r ;1 Ii 1\ i I I il 11 ) J; P Ii 14 ~ . 11 I! I; !, :; !: !: Ii \ "~\ . . ..... ....... ~.::~/ .: ". ..,: . .'? . ... : -. ,., "", :::'. '.' . . "'~ ~'.-:-- ',. , " ", .. - .... . '.~ '.' - .... .... .' ... - . ...... . :.'.:. .. ~ ." -: ".:, .- .. <- .' ":', .: .... '." .. I